

FRANCIS FERDINAND AND HUNGARY

By

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The peoples of the Monarchy "took him to be a great sphinx," as we read in the memoirs of a Hungarian politician who, a rare exception among Hungarian gentlemen, felt drawn to the heir apparent killed at Sarajevo.¹ At that time the well-informed circles of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy were, of course, more or less, aware of the plans devised in Belvedere Palace; but all this was a real enigma to the public. Numerous memoirs were published after the fall of the Habsburg Monarchy, i. e. between the two World Wars, and series of treatments extended to the years following World War II, in which the posthumous papers of Francis Ferdinand had become accessible for research and formed a source basis as well. All this revealed to those outside informed circles and to posterity the political work under the surface and the future intentions of the Archduke, both hated and mysterious in his own age.²

Modern historiography concerned with the historical role of the Habsburg Monarchy and the problems of its disintegration devotes considerable attention, with different appraisal and frequent debates thorough, to all the reform plans framed for a renewal of the empire at that time. Indeed, in this polemic, it seems promising to recall Francis Ferdinand's plans for reshaping the empire. His Hungarian policy was always a cardinal point in them.

From 1889, following the early tragic death of Rudolph, the only son of Francis Joseph, the younger brother of the monarch, the Archduke Charles Louis became heir apparent to the throne. But he was only a few years younger than his brother and therefore attention was concentrated on his sons rather than on him. Namely, it seemed problematic whether Charles Louis would survive his elder brother at all; and even if he did, and acceded to the throne, it seemed evident that he could not have ruled long in view of his advanced age. Hence a lasting regime replacing the reign of Francis Joseph, one that might also have time enough for creative acts, could only be expected from his sons.

Francis Ferdinand, elder son of Charles Louis, was 26 years old when his father became heir apparent and so he was the doubtless successor to the crown. He himself became heir apparent only seven

years after, in 1896 upon his father's death; but already in the first half of the 90's he regarded himself, and was regarded by the people surrounding him, the only successor. Only the event of his possible early death, which was common talk then because of his ill-health, could have shifted his expected role to his younger brother. His ideas about his future duties as a ruler took shape already in those years. His contemporaries and biographers, the earlier and the later ones alike, refer to the fact that his future reform plans, in their basic outlines, formulated at that time, and even if they changed later on, their essence was clearly manifest already. In his study published on the 100th anniversary of the Crown-Prince's birth Rudolf Kiszling³, his most recent Austrian biographer stressed again that „the reformplans of Francis Ferdinand, which never were fully accomplished, date back to about 1895.”⁴

In the first half of the 90's, when Francis Ferdinand's reform plans concerned with the structural questions of the Habsburg Monarchy were shaped in outline, the initial signs of crises, unsolved in the past and brought about by newer contradictions, appeared already in the empire that was temporarily consolidated by the dualistic transformation of 1867. The internal consolidation of the empire after 1867, and its relative internal peace resulted from the partial solution of domestic problems and from the strengthening of its international position. The rearrangement of 1867 brought more liberal conditions in both parts of the empire, and paved the way for a wide bourgeois development, numerous vestiges of feudalism lived on, however. The influence of the aristocracy and the gentry in political life was still a reality, and demands of the peasantry and the rising middle-class, both in the economic life and in the political sphere, remained unsatisfied to a considerable extent. The problems of internal nationality questions were partially solved as well. Due to the loss of Lombardy and Venice it was only to a small extent that the Italian movement formed a domestic problem, and even this on account of the possession of South-Tyrol and Trieste. In the first decade of the Triple Alliance this caused no problem in foreign affairs, either. After the wars of 1866 and 1870 the struggles about the question of the German unity came to an end as well. Even the Hungarian national movement lost its explosive force the compromise of 1867. All this promoted the consolidation of the empire. The national problem of the Slavs and Roumanians, however, included by the Monarchy, remained unsolved; and these nations, representing separately no such force as, earlier, the Hungarians or Italians though, formed an overwhelming majority in the population of the empire.

In spite of these unsolved domestic problems a consolidation and a relative peace in the Habsburg Monarchy after 1867 were possible, because in the decades following the compromise both discontented peasantry and unsatisfied nationalities were still weak, and the labour movement, more and more perceptible going along with the bourgeois progress, was still at an early stage. On the other hand the democratic popular and national movements had, by the 90's, gained considerable

strength and labourers organized into class also appeared in the political arena. In addition to this, contradictions in the dualistic relationship of Hungary and Austria gained prominence. Namely, in the first half of the 90's, the problems of the Austro-Hungarian relation became an issue in the political circles of the Hungarian leading classes as well. Although none of the groups in the leading Hungarian political stratum wanted to disrupt dualism, i. e. the marriage between Austria and Hungary, certain layers of the wealthy Hungarian classes, however, to which a union of customs areas or an economic policy supporting the Austrian finance-capital were disadvantageous, tried to fight out more advantageous positions for themselves. The state structure of the Monarchy, its entire social system, showed the signs of a incipient crisis in the 90's.⁵

In the beginning, i. e. in the 90's, Francis Ferdinand's ideas were, adjusted to new circumstances, similar to the policy of the Archduke Albrecht's military party in the 60's and 70's. In its days rather than supporting the compromise which opened up opportunities to liberal forces as well, this old line wanted to strengthen the Austrian, Czech, Polish and Hungarian feudal aristocracy in the provinces, and pushing dualism aside wished to create a "federation" of the lands and provinces of the crown, that would give more prominence to central imperial power and make it capable of conquests. This idea was forced in the background at the time of the success of the dualistic system. But when the crisis came, it claimed of creating a possibility of a solution.

Taking up the lost thread, Francis Ferdinand went far beyond the archduke Albrecht concerning his plans for consolidating imperial power. All through the two decades of his activity, the starting-point of the Crown-Prince was, in all his conceptions of home and foreign policy, as follows: increase the power of the dynasty in order that the empire of the Habsburg Monarchy should be resplendent with her old glory again. "In the beginning, his ideas" writes Kiszling "resembled the structure of the United States of America: i. e. a federation of the crown lands with a strong central power."⁶ To identify the terms with their actual contents, in Francis Ferdinand's conception of the 90's, the essence was not really federalism, it was centralism. What he called "Kronlandföderalismus" with a strong "Zentralgewalt" was in fact a centralized state divided into provinces. A recent biographer of the Austrian prime minister baron Beck, contemporary and for a while adherent of the crown-prince, is of the same opinion: Francis Ferdinand "used federalism only as master stroke in applying the principle of divide et impera. Federalist structure was to indirectly serve the consolidation of central power."⁷ On his views in the 90's, similar information is given by baron Margutti, a trusted man of the Habsburg House who, in the mid-90's, often discussed the situation and the chances of the Monarchy with Francis Ferdinand. On such an occasion the Archduke himself elucidated the equilibrium system of the "federalism" and its centralistic essence relying on the German element both voiced by him, with a typical and interesting comparison: "Just as bigger stones and pebbles are

crushed for making up concrete, reliably stable and actually ever-lasting, in order that the cement permeating the mass fuse the joining stones in a homogeneous manner and make an unbreakable stone block of them, the elements of a federal state must also be equivalent so that the permanence of the state be ensured by a solid cohesion that excludes any outburst of antagonisms. It is therefore that I should like to dismember present-day Hungary into four or five such state elements, present-day Bohemia into two, present-day Galicia also into two parts; then the German people in Hungary and Bohemia could be strengthened to the same extent as in its Austrian mother provinces proper."⁸

To divide too large units into smaller ones, first of all Hungary in the dualistic system, meant no articulation into national units in Francis Ferdinand's range of thoughts. It was in the provincial structure of feudal origin that the crown-prince tried to find a justification for such divisions, and became no adherent of one according to a truly national principle later on, either. "He took historic right not only more valuable, but also stronger than the nationality principle".⁹ During one of the very last plannings, in spring 1914, Baron Eichhoff recommended an internal division according to language boundaries based on the Popovici scheme. The crown-prince rejected this, saying he did not want to alter the crown-land frontiers shaped historically, because he relied on crown-land patriotism.¹⁰ Prominent role of the German element in the empire and elevation of German to the status of a unified official language of the state — which does not contradict „Kronlandpatriotismus" since this is not of national character — are important components of the "cement" holding the stones together. But the principal support of central power, the chief component in the Francis-Ferdinandian cement, is the unified army. When he had to give up his original ideas about crushing too big stones and thought of trialism and, finally, of the inevitable acceptance of dualism, both creation of full unity in the army and its absolute subordination to the monarch remained in all his plans and was made a central issue even then, for it was in this that he saw the principal safeguard of the growing of the Monarchy. Francis Ferdinand was utterly dissatisfied with the position of the army in the empire. He not only disapproved of the authorization of the honvédség (the Hungarian army) and Landwehr though these two put together accounted only for one-fifth of the infantry and the cavalry; he was still more dissatisfied with the fact that recruitment was voted by the parliaments. Francis Ferdinand wanted to carry through a full unification of military affairs and an absolutistic monarchical administration of all matters connected with the army at any rate. In this respect, he would not give up his point later on either, and this indicates the centralistic essence of his empire-transforming conception. Chief of Staff, Conrad von Hötzendorf mentions in his memoirs that "unifying the whole under firm central power" was fundamental in the empire-transforming trend of the Crown-Prince.¹¹

It was dualism, and the Hungarian leading stratum rigidly insisting on it that he regarded the chief obstacle to his aspiration directed at

restoring the old strength of the imperial power. "Francis Ferdinand's views on home politics culminated in his unshakeable conviction that, unless there would soon be a turning-point, the Danubian Monarchy must collapse because of Hungary. He always and everywhere pondered over any possible means to crush the political power of Hungary in the future."¹²

Some time back certain authors ascribed Francis Ferdinand's hatred towards the Hungarian leading stratum to psychological reasons, to juvenile experiences and affronts. But there is no need for such vague explanations. This mutual antipathy and hatred had its roots in the contradictions of the basis political attitude. Hungarian leading circles were soon, i.e. already in the early 90's, informed about what the eldest son of the Crown-Prince Charles Louis had in the back of his mind, and made no secret of their hopes that this perturbing problem might as well be solved by his continual ill-health. On such an occasion, in autumn 1895, when news came again of his serious condition, *Pesti Hírlap* wrote, with unmistakable emphasis: "He is already being prayed for..." Francis Ferdinand, as so often later on, too, did not conceal his rage and turned to the monarch. The letter, found recently in his posthumous papers, deserves full quotation:

„Your Majesty,

I permit myself to send to Your Majesty enclosed an issue of *Magyar Hírlap* which contains a really infamous article about me, and to draw your attention to it; at the same time I appeal to you to protect me, if it is still possible, from the attacks to which I am constantly exposed in Hungary.

I was already accustomed to attacks from this quarter, because these people know very well what I think of them — these people who for the 1,000 years of their existence have constantly rebelled against the established dynasty, constantly aimed at overthrowing this dynasty and allying themselves with the enemy — these people who brought to my Emperor nothing but grievous insult, calamity and discord. One only has to call to mind the years '48, '59, '66, and finally the Compromise of 67, which shook the old, tried establishment of the monarchy to its foundations. I know that I am not popular in Hungary, and in a way I am proud of the fact, because I do not ask for the respect of such a people.

But that such a thing could be written in a country which after all still belongs to the monarchy — such an infamous outburst, where in every line unrestrained joy at my illness and probable death breaks through, this I could not have imagined before!

This hurts and enrages me all the more since this paper is in touch with the government of Your Majesty.

But one should not wonder at it, with a Freemason government which glorifies a man like Kossuth and uses him for its ends and which introduces civil marriage into a Catholic country.

To such a government a man who thinks in conservative and dynastic terms as I do is obviously an object of horror. Therefore, no confisca-

tion, no disavowal, nothing at all resulted from the article in Hungary, and our good *Vaterland* published a notice which I allow myself to enclose.

I remain in the hope of retaining the favour of Your Majesty; with deepest reference,

Your Majesty's most
submissive nephew Franz
Ferdinand.¹³

Francis Ferdinand's early ideas pointing in a centralist direction, and the aspirations of the leading Hungarian stratum for consistent application of the dualistic principle, as is shown by the letter above, produced mutual antipathy as early as the first half of the 90's.

Francis Ferdinand had to be deluded in his hopes if he counted upon the monarch clearly taking his side in the confrontation formulating with the Hungarian leaders.

It was in a consolidation of the established structure that Francis Joseph sought solution to his problems. Having become heir apparent in 1896, Francis Ferdinand was, however, ceaselessly bringing up the necessity of some structural change. It was exactly therefore that the monarch never granted him actual right of disposal in political matters. Outwardly, especially towards monarchical states, he frequently appeared to substitute for the monarch in person, but this was rather a protocolar procedure and did not mean direct interference with the conduct of foreign affairs. But as concerned the internal problems of the army, Francis Joseph granted more and more actual power to the crown-prince, and eventually, in 1873, appointed him Inspector general (Generalinspektor) of the army, by which he conferred the dignity next to that of the generalissimo on him as well.

„Wherever he could, he suppressed, pushed back and neglected the crown-prince“ writes Kristóffy. „God forbid that he should have accepted only one of his suggestions in political affairs. . . . Concerning the army, on the other hand, including even personal matters, he granted his nephew a completely free hand.“¹⁴

Exclusion of the crown-prince from the management of political affairs, not eased by Francis Joseph before 1914, at the circumstances of the visit to Sarajevo, and granting him a fully free hand in the matters of the army at the same time, was most tightly connected with the essence of the differences between the views of the monarch and the crown-prince. The monarch prevented Francis Ferdinand from acting in fields where matters were administered according to the dualistic principle; but Austrian centralism dominated in the Austro-Hungarian army and Francis Ferdinand's decisive say in the internal affairs of the army was a guarantee for maintaining this situation.

Barred from political leadership as he was, the Crown-Prince Francis Ferdinand got a strong foothold in the army. He tried to utilize this po-

sition penetrating into other spheres of the imperial administration, as well.

In Belvedere Palace, which became his residence at the turn of the century, there was the „military bureau“ of the Crown-Prince set up, that, strangely enough, more and more engaged in political questions. This was how his „workshop“, as his surroundings were called, took shape, where future plans of home and foreign policy, personal combinations and relationship were devised. No program was worked out in detail, however. It was only outlines of actions and corresponding measures that took shape. „The Archduke had“, writes Count Czernin, who belonged to his suite, in one of his memoirs, „clear-cut and definite ideas on transforming the Monarchy, but only in a general form. Actually it was a framework for a program never to be filled up or laid down in detail.“¹⁵

Francis Ferdinand's antipathy and hatred towards the Hungarian leaders particularly flared up in the years after the turn of the century when the increase of the recruit force was accepted by the majority party with great reluctance, the parliamentary opposition hindered enactment through obstruction, and even tried to export additional rights for the Hungarian parliament in military affairs. It was at this time that encouragement was repeatedly heard from Belvedere to crush the Hungarian parliament through external force, that the adventurist desire of „einmarschieren“ was voiced.

It was amid the Hungarian parliamentary struggles surrounding the army issue and becoming more and more vehement that in the plannings of the Crown-Prince the conception of a trialism with the inclusion of Croatia emerged about 1903. This structure was clearly intended for a transitory tactical solution, expressly for crushing dualism, i.e. the influence of Hungarian leading circles on the affairs of the empire. Actually, Francis Ferdinand was, in principle, as much against trialism as was opposed to dualism. When in 1901 he felt that there was such a danger on the part of the Czechs, he insisted on a categorical rejection in a letter written to the Austrian prime minister: „With dualism we already have pushed our Monarchy to the brink of the grave and now just as eminent a danger emerges on the part of the Czechs! The situation is that if we yield now, have dealings with the Czechs and make concessions to them, everything will be lost and we will artificially produce a trialism which will completely destroy the structure of the Monarchy already too much relaxed.“¹⁶

The conception of a trialism to be created with Croatia was embraced for a short time; in the background there by the old Habsburgian tactics of applying the principle of „divide and rule“, by supporting the Croatian movement to counteract Hungarian demands raised towards Vienna. In autumn 1905, under the effect of the „Fiume resolution“, Francis Ferdinand gave up this policy since he felt that in the Croatian movement „the antagonism directed, so far, only against Budapest, has now assumed an antidynastic character.“¹⁷

In 1906 the followers of Francis Ferdinand got hold of important positions in Austrian politics and his influence was felt intensely with their mediation for a few years. Baron Beck, former tutor, then intimate man to the crown-prince, was made prime minister of Austria in spring 1906.¹⁸

In autumn 1906, his trusted men were appointed to important posts of the Monarchy, such as those of commonminister of foreign affairs (baron Aehrenthal), commonminister of war (general Schönaich), the post of the chief of staff (Conrad von Hötzendorf). The influence of Francis Ferdinand was strong at that time not only in Austrian and Austro-Hungarian governmental matters but also in Austrian political parties, moreover, in publicist circles as well. He also rallied leaders round himself of the nationalities in Hungary, such as the politicians Vaida-Voevod and Maniu (Roumanians), Milian Hodzha (Slovak), Wilder (Croatian), Steinacker and Brandsch (Transylvanian Saxons). There was talk, with some exaggeration though, about a "dual government" in political circles of Vienna in those years, hinting thereby at the dissimilar political courses of Francis Joseph and Francis Ferdinand. The „workshop“ of Belvedere Palace was busy at that time, indeed, although its products were little appreciated by contemporaries and historical judgement in general.

The hatred of the Crown-Prince against Hungarian ruling classes brought him to contact nationality leaders of Hungary, and he also kept winking at the Hungarian labour movement. He objected to an introduction of universal suffrage in Austria in 1906 which reduced the importance of the German element. In Hungary, in 1905, he supported the policy of Kristóffy and Fehérváry promising suffrage for it was thereby that he hoped to bring the Hungarian ruling classes to heel. Francis Ferdinand wanted to assign an important role to the Catholic Church and especially supported the Austrian Christian Socialists. He wanted to make Lueger, Christian Socialist leader in Vienna, his prime minister. That the Crown-Prince should have wanted to depend on lower classes is nothing but a legend, a similar one to his federalism. As Margutti recorder Francis Ferdinand, just as Francis Joseph, relied, first of all, on the aristocracy; but he was hostile to the Hungarian aristocracy and considered all means suitable for crushing their political power.¹⁹

The antipathy against Francis Ferdinand was no less profound in the Hungarian leading circles. Of political parties it was only the leading circles of the Catholic Popular Party that established contacts with him. Certain Hungarian politicians and publicists, e.g. Kristóffy, did belong to his „workshop“, but they were no representatives of the stratum of the Hungarian society.

In 1911 Tisza, the man most generally recognized by leading Hungarian circles, overtly told Count Czernin, confidential man to the Crown-Prince, that in the defence of the enacted dualistic system the nationality policy in connection he would if it need be even oppose the King.²⁰ It was therefor that Francis Ferdinand regarded Count Tisza a "rebel." On the occasion of the Count's being made head of government again, he

told his trusted man, Berdolff that, if he accede to the throne "it would not even be for 24 hours that he would have the Count at the head of the administration or else he would risk that, in 48 hours, the Count should organise a revolution against him."²¹

Francis Ferdinand's plan to "reform" the Monarchy was a retrograde attempt. It would have given the aristocracy, the court and the German element of the empire still greater power. This "reform" plan was unreal at the same time, and an attempt at its practical implementation could have precipitated a still more serious internal crisis. It was not out of their sympathizing with progress however, that the Hungarian leading circles opposed these plans. They simply defended the structure of dualism. Insistence on the dualistic conception was also retrograde, because it involved the oppression of the democratic aspirations of nationalities and masses of population. A renaissance could only have been brought about by a democratic transformation, or at least by a step towards democratic progress. And this was opposed to both by Francis Ferdinandian and dualistic conception alike.

After all, the crown-prince never found sufficient support in the leading Austrian circles either, and many of his former adherents abandoned him; nor could he neglect the uniform reserve of the Hungarian leading classes. "He had to pour more and more water in the wine of his political plans for the future" writes Margutti, "... and at last he ended up at nothing else but dualism. Despite all this, I do not think that he ever should have given up his original plans completely and irrevocably."²²

A survey of Francis Ferdinand's plans and aspirations towards reshaping the empire, as well as their fate, indicates that the leading classes of the Habsburg Monarchy were lacking in the capacity and the possibility of bringing about any progressive, sound renewal of the empire. It calls for a separate study to decide whether such a possibility was given by the movements of the democratic forces which were alien to both Francis Ferdinand and the Hungarian leading classes and against which they both displayed a hostile attitude.

These findings of our analysis are confirmed if we include a study of plans in the field of foreign policy. This is justified in every respect. There is always an organic correlation between the internal structure of a given country and its foreign policy. Francis Ferdinand's empire-transforming plans and his ideas in foreign affairs show close correlation, as well.

Following the traditions of Albrecht's military party, Francis Ferdinand was for resolute actions, in foreign policy. Not against the Prussians though, as Albrecht did, but in alliance with the Germans and by neutralizing Russia he was planning against the Balkan peoples. He strived not only for the annexation Bosnia and Herzegovina, already occupied, but also for that of entire Serbia. He had, however, in addition to the acquisition of further considerable Southern Slav territories, also that of Roumania in mind. In order to win over the Roumainan leaders for this plan, he would have held out the prospect of surrendering Transylvania to a Roumania embodied in the Monarchy.²³

Serbia and Roumania were to be further building-stones in the territorially growing empire. But Francis Ferdinand's empire-building plans went far beyond that. For the Monarchy he planned to obtain the Balkan territories still possessed by Turkey, which then were given to the Balkan countries as a result of the Balkan War of 1912. By this he planned to create a basis for the Monarchy for its colonization scheme overseas. He wanted to set up naval bases on the Albanian seashore and at Salonika. "He envisaged the acquisition of colonies" wrote Kristóffy, "which he planned to carry out through Albania and Salonika."²⁴ It was this that his special attention devoted to the navy was connected with. The Crown-Prince planned to make the Monarchy a big sea power. He often donned his admiral's uniform and was fond of sailing to the island of Brioni by one of the battleships. He incessantly urged the construction of expensive dreadnoughts and reproached Francis Joseph for neglecting this branch of military development.

Francis Ferdinand also wanted to reshape the relations of the Monarchy with the Great Powers. For this he did not intend to relax the alliance with the Germans, he wished to create rather a new triple alliance by reviving the former agreement of the three emperors. The foreign minister Aehrenthal acted, presumably, in accord with Francis Ferdinand's intention when he pondered over an intervention in support of the czar in a critical stage of the Russian revolution²⁵. He wanted to create this alliance of the three emperors on a "Holy Alliance" pattern: he emphasized the common interest on an internal consolidation of the dynasties.

Besides Serbia, the Crown-Prince was especially hostile towards Italy, for it was this country that he regarded the most immediate endangerer of the building up of his naval power and of his expansion in the Balkans.

The Vienna court and official Austrian leading circles did not identify themselves with Francis Ferdinand's conception of foreign policy, but ideas similar to his appeared in their policy. There were influential adherents in Austrian leading circles of the annexation of Serbia and of the solution of the South Slav problem within the scope of the Monarchy. In the years preceding the War, Francis Joseph himself was also strongly inclined towards solving the South Slav question by further annexations.²⁶ Plans of the Crown-Prince about foreign policy were also strongly objected to by Hungarian leading circles. The acquisition of Serbia and Roumania would have meant the loss of the South Slav and Transylvanian nationality territories; on the other hand, a further increase of the nationality element within the Monarchy would have made it difficult to maintain dualism. They, too, urged the weakening of these two countries and their binding to the Monarchy, but wanted to retain a formal, legally independent status with them by all means, since it was only in this way that they regarded both uncurtailed rule over the nationalities and the system of dualism guaranteed.

Annexation of Serbia and Roumania would also have entailed economic disadvantage to the agrarian interests of the Hungarian big

landowners. Hungarian big estates enjoyed a monopolistic position within the customs area of the Monarchy. This monopoly would have been endangered by Roumanian and Serbian agricultural products, had they come within this customs area.

Hungarian leading circles did not share the sharply anti-Italian line of the Crown-Prince, either, and considered an excessive building up of naval power illusory, too. Yet, a hegemony over the Balkans was, on a different pattern of concrete solution though, just as much desired by them. The final results of our investigation into empire-transforming conceptions seem to be confirmed by this survey over the plans and debates on foreign policy. Foreign policy both Francis Ferdinandian and official, this latter supported by the Hungarian leading stratum as well, were aimed at hamstringing the peoples of the Balkan. Understanding their interests was alien to both, just as empire-transforming conceptions of Francis Ferdinand and conceptions insisting on dualism equally failed to comprehend the democratic and national interests of the peoples enclosed in the empire and dependent on one another.

NOTES

- ¹ *Kristóffy, J.*: Magyarország kálváriája (The Calvary of Hungary), Budapest, 1927, p. 446.
- ² Among the memoirs available, especially important information is supplied by those of Conrad, Czernin, Margutti, Bardolff, Bülow, Kristóffy, Eisenmenger, etc. Among older works the writings of Chlumecky, Franz, Sosnoky, Bruckner, Eöttevényi, etc. are worth mentioning. A monograph dealing with him has recently been published by Kiszling, but important chapters relating to him are to be found in a number of more recent works, especially in the writings of Hantsch, Kann, Dedijer, Allmayer-Beck, etc. Among the Hungarian authors indicating important aspects in their writings are I. Dolmányos, F. Pölöskei, Gy. Mérei, P. Hanák, I. Diószegi, and others.
- ³ *Kiszling, R.*: Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand von Österreich-Este. Leben, Pläne und Wirken am Schicksalsweg der Donaumonarchie. Graz-Köln, 1953.
- ⁴ *Kiszling, R.*: Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand und seine Pläne für den Umbau der Donaumonarchie. Der Donauraum, vol. 5, p. 262.
- ⁵ See *Hanák, P.*: A dualizmus válságának problémái a XIX. század végén (Problems of the Crisis of Dualism at the End of the 19th Century) Történelmi Szemle, 1965, nos. 1-2.
- ⁶ Kiszling, op. cit. p. 262.
- ⁷ *Allmayer-Beck, J. Ch.*: Ministerpräsident Baron Beck. Ein Staatsmann des alten Österreich. Vienna, 1965, p. 104.
- ⁸ *Freiherr von Margutti, A.*: Kaiser Franz Joseph. Persönliche Erinnerungen. Vienna - Leipzig, 1924 p. 117.
- ⁹ Kristóffy, op. cit. p. 409.
- ¹⁰ Kiszling, op. cit. p. 265.
- ¹¹ *Conrad*: Aus meiner Dienstzeit, 1906-1918. Vienna-Leipzig-Munich, 1923, vol. IV, p. 15.
- ¹² Margutti: op. cit. p. 114.
- ¹³ Reported by Dedijer: The Road to Sarajevo, New York, 1966, pp. 96-97.
- ¹⁴ Kristóffy, op. cit. p. 422.
- ¹⁵ *Czernin, O.*: Im Weltkrieg, Vienna, 1919, pp. 63-64.
- ¹⁶ *Sieghart*: Die letzten Jahrzehnte einer Grossmacht, Berlin, 1932. Appendix, p. 462.

- ¹⁷ Kiszling, op. cit. p. 263. The "Fiume Resolution" of October 3, 1905, is the declaration of the circle of Supilo who joined forces with the Serbs in Croatia. In this he supports the struggles of the Hungarian opposition and combines it with the attainment of the Croatian national objectives, including a junction of Dalmatia to Croatia.
- ¹⁸ One year later they were no longer on good terms because baron Beck did not entirely follow his intentions and supported the introduction of universal suffrage in Austria.
- ¹⁹ Margutti, op. cit. pp. 225, 397.
- ²⁰ Czernin, O.: Emlékeim Tisza István grófról (My Recollections about Count István Tisza) Budapest, 1929, p. 9.
- ²¹ Quoted by Fischer, F.: Krieg der Illusionen, Düsseldorf, 1969., p. 608.
- ²² Margutti, op. cit. pp. 122–123.
- ²³ Czernin: Im Weltkriege, p. 64.
- ²⁴ Kristóffy, op. cit. p. 405.
- ²⁵ He himself mentioned it to Uebersberger later on. Uebersberger, H.: Österreich zwischen Russland und Serbien, Köln–Graz, 1958, p. 11.
- ²⁶ Margutti, op. cit. pp. 233–234.